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We present a model of optimal intervention in a flight to quality episode. The reason for intervention
stems from a collective bias in agents' expectations. Agents in the model make risk management decisions
with incomplete knowledge. They understand their own shocks, but are uncertain of how correlated
their shocks are with systemwide shocks, treating the latter uncertainty as Knightian. We show that
when aggregate liquidity is low, an increase in uncertainty leads agents to a series of protective actions
-- decreasing risk exposures, hoarding liquidity, locking-up capital -- that reflect a flight to quality.
However, the conservative actions of agents leave the aggregate economy over-exposed to negative
shocks. Each agent covers himself against his own worst-case scenario, but the scenario that the collective
of agents are guarding against is impossible.  A lender of last resort, even if less knowledgeable than
private agents about individual shocks, does not suffer from this collective bias and finds that pledging
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“... Policy practitioners operating under a risk-management paradigm may, at
times, be led to undertake actions intended to provide insurance against especially
adverse outcomes...... When confronted with uncertainty, especially Knightian
uncertainty, human beings invariably attempt to disengage from medium to long-
term commitments in favor of safety and liquidity.... The immediate response on
the part of the central bank to such ﬁnancial implosions must be to inject large
quantities of liquidity...” Alan Greenspan (2004).
Flight to quality episodes are an important source of ﬁnancial and macroeconomic insta-
bility. Modern examples of these episodes in the US include the Penn Central default of 1970;
the stock market crash of 1987; the events of the Fall of 1998 beginning with the Russian
default and ending with the bailout of LTCM; as well as the events that followed the attacks
of 9/11. Behind each of these episodes lies the specter of a meltdown that may lead to a
prolonged slowdown as in Japan during the 1990s, or even a catastrophe like the Great De-
pression.1 In each of them, as hinted at by Greenspan, the Fed intervened early and stood
ready to intervene as much as needed to prevent a meltdown.
In this paper we present a model to study the beneﬁts of central bank actions during
ﬂight to quality episodes. Our model has two key ingredients: capital/liquidity shortages and
Knightian uncertainty. The capital shortage ingredient is a recurring theme in the empirical
and theoretical literature on ﬁnancial crises and requires little motivation. Knightian uncer-
tainty is less commonly studied, but practitioners perceive it as a central ingredient to ﬂight
to quality episodes (see Greenspan’s quote).
Most ﬂight to quality episodes are triggered by unanticipated or unexpected events. In
1970, the Penn-Central Railroad’s default on prime rated commercial paper caught the market
by surprise and forced investors to re-evaluate their models of credit risk. The ensuing dynam-
ics temporarily shut out a large segment of commercial paper borrowers from a vital source
of funds. In October 1987, the speed of the stock market decline took investors and market
markers by surprise, causing them to question their models. Investors pulled back from the
market while key market-makers widened bid-ask spreads. In the fall of 1998, the comovement
1See Table 1 (part A) in Barro (2005) for a comprehensive list of extreme events in developed economies
during the 20th century.
2of Russian government bond spreads, Brazilian spreads, and U.S. Treasury bond spreads was
a surprise to even sophisticated market participants. These high correlations rendered stan-
dard risk management models obsolete, leaving ﬁnancial market participants searching for
new models. Agents responded by making decisions using “worst-case” scenarios and “stress-
testing” models. Finally, after 9/11, regulators were concerned that commercial banks would
respond to the increased uncertainty over the status of other commercial banks by individually
hoarding liquidity and that such actions would lead to gridlock in the payments system.2
The common aspects of investor behavior across these episodes – re-evaluation of models,
conservatism, and disengagement from risky activities – indicate that these episodes involved
Knightian uncertainty and not merely an increase in risk. The emphasis on tail outcomes and
worst-case scenarios in agents’ decision rules suggests uncertainty aversion rather than simply
risk aversion. It is also noteworthy that when it comes to ﬂight to quality episodes, history
seldom repeats itself. Similar magnitudes of commercial paper default (Mercury Finance in
1997) or stock market pullbacks (mini-crash of 1989) did not lead to similar investor responses.
Today, as opposed to in 1998, market participants understand that correlations should be
expected to rise during periods of reduced liquidity. Creditors understand the risk involved
in lending to hedge funds. While in 1998 hedge funds were still a novel ﬁnancial vehicle,
the recent default of the Amaranth hedge fund barely caused a ripple in ﬁnancial markets.
The one-of-a-kind aspect of ﬂight to quality episodes supports the view that uncertainty is an
important ingredient in these episodes.
Section 2 of the paper lays out a model of ﬁnancial crises based on liquidity shortages
and Knightian uncertainty. We analyze the model’s equilibrium and show that an increase
in Knightian uncertainty or decrease in aggregate liquidity can reproduce ﬂight to quality
eﬀects. Knightian uncertainty leads agents to make decisions based on worst-case scenarios.
When the aggregate quantity of liquidity is limited, the Knightian agent grows concerned that
he will be caught in a situation where he needs liquidity, but there is not enough liquidity
available to him. In this context, agents react by shedding risky ﬁnancial claims in favor
of safe and uncontingent claims. Financial intermediaries become self-protective and hoard
liquidity. Investment banks and trading desks turn conservative in their allocation of risk
capital. They lock up capital and become unwilling to ﬂexibly move it across markets.
The main results of our paper are in Sections 3 and 4. As indicated by Greenspan’s
2See Calomiris (1994) on the Penn-Central default, Melamed (1988) on the 1987 market crash, Scholes
(2000) on the events of 1998, and Stewart (2002) or Ashcraft and Duﬃe (2006) on 9/11.
3comments, the Fed has historically intervened during ﬂight to quality episodes. We analyze
the macroeconomic properties of the equilibrium and study the eﬀects of central bank actions
in our environment. First, we show that Knightian uncertainty leads to a collective bias
in agents’ actions: Each agent covers himself against his own worst-case scenario, but the
scenario that the collective of agents are guarding against is impossible, and known to be
so despite agents’ uncertainty about the environment. We show that agents’ conservative
actions such as liquidity hoarding and locking-up of capital are macroeconomically costly as
they exacerbate the aggregate shortage of liquidity. Central bank policy can be designed
to alleviate the over-conservatism. We show that a lender of last resort (LLR), even one
facing the same incomplete knowledge that triggers agents’ Knightian responses, can unlock
capital and improve outcomes. It does so by committing to intervene during extreme events
when agents’ liquidity is depleted. Importantly, because these extreme events are unlikely,
the expected cost of this intervention is minimal. If credible, the policy derives its power from
a private sector multiplier: each pledged dollar of public intervention in the extreme event is
matched by a comparable private sector reaction to free up capital. In this sense, the LTCM
bailout was important not for its direct eﬀect, but because it served as a signal of the Fed’s
readiness to intervene should conditions worsen. The signal unlocked private capital markets.
The value of the LLR facility is usually analyzed in terms of Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983)
model of bank runs. The LLR rules out the “bad” run equilibrium in their model. While our
environment is a variant of Diamond and Dybvig’s, it does not include the sequential service
constraint that leads to a coordination failure and informs their discussion of policy. The
beneﬁt of the LLR in our model derives from a diﬀerent mechanism, which is the collectivebias
in agent decisions caused by an increase in Knightian uncertainty. Our model also provides a
clear presciption to central banks on when to intervene in ﬁnancial markets: The beneﬁt of the
LLR is highest when there is both insuﬃcient aggregate liquidity and Knightian uncertainty.
We also show that the LLR must be a last-resort policy: If liquidity injections take place too
often, the policy exacerbates the private sector’s mistakes and reduces the value of intervention.
This occurs for reasons akin to the moral hazard problem identiﬁed with the LLR.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) study how a shortage of aggregate collateral limits private
liquidity provision (see also Woodford, 1990). Their analysis suggests that a credible govern-
ment can issue government bonds which can then be used by the private sector for liquidity
provision. The key diﬀerence between our paper and those of Holmstrom and Tirole, and
Woodford, is that we show how even aggregate collateral may be ineﬃciently used, so that
4private sector liquidity provision is limited. In our model, the government intervention not
only adds to the private sector’s collateral but also, and more centrally, it improves the use of
private collateral.
Routledge and Zin (2004) and Easley and O’Hara (2005) are two related analyses of Knigh-
tian uncertainty in ﬁnancial markets.3 Routledge and Zin begin from the observation that
ﬁnancial institutions follow decision rules to protect against a worst case scenario. They de-
velop a model of market liquidity in which an uncertainty averse market maker sets bids and
asks to facilitate trade of an asset. Their model captures an important aspect of ﬂight to
quality: uncertainty aversion can lead to a sudden widening of the bid-ask spread, causing
agents to halt trading and reducing market liquidity. Both our paper and Routledge and Zin
share the emphasis on ﬁnancial intermediation and uncertainty aversion as central ingredients
in ﬂight to quality episodes. But each paper captures diﬀerent aspects of ﬂight to quality.
Easley and O’Hara (2005) study a model where ambiguity (uncertainty) averse traders focus
on a worst case scenario when making an investment decision. Like us, Easley and O’Hara
point out that government intervention in a worst-case scenario can have large eﬀects. Easley
and O’Hara study how uncertainty aversion aﬀects investor participation in stock markets,
while the focus of our study is on uncertainty aversion and ﬁnancial crises.
Finally, in our model agents are only Knightian with respect to systemic events. Epstein
(2001) explores the home bias in international portfolios in a related setup, where agents are
more uncertain about foreign than local markets.4 As Epstein points out, this modelling also
highlights the diﬀerence between high risk aversion and aversion to Knightian uncertainty.
Moreover, our modelling shows that max-min preferences interact with macroeconomic con-
ditions in ways that are not present in models with an invariant amount of risk aversion.
We show that when aggregate liquidity is plentiful, Knightian and standard agents behave
identically. However when there is an aggregate liquidity shortage, the actions of these agents
diﬀer, leading to ﬂight to quality in the Knightian model.
3There is a growing economics literature that aims to formalize Knightian uncertainty (a partial list of
contributions includes, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein and Wang (1994),
Epstein (2001), Hansen and Sargent (1995, 2003), Skiadas (2003), Epstein and Schneider (2004), and Hansen,
et al. (2004)). As in much of this literature, we use a max-min device to describe agents expected utility. Our
treatment of Knightian uncertainty is most similar to Gilboa and Schmeidler, in that agents choose a worst
case among a class of priors.
4Epstein’s model is closely related to our model in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005).
52 The Model
We study a model conditional on entering a turmoil period where liquidity risk and Knightian
uncertainty coexist. Our model is silent on what triggers the episode. In practice, we think
that the occurrence of an unexpected event, such as the Penn Central default or 9/11, causes
agents to re-evaluate their models and triggers robustness concerns. Our goal is to present a
model to study the role of a centralized liquidity provider such as the central bank.
2.1 The environment
PREFERENCES AND SHOCKS
The model has a continuum of competitive agents, which are indexed by ω ∈ Ω ≡ [0,1].
An agent may receive a liquidity shock in which he needs some liquidity immediately. We
view these liquidity shocks as a parable for a sudden need for capital by a ﬁnancial market
specialist (e.g. a trading desk, hedge fund, market maker).
The shocks are correlated across agents. With probability φ(1), the economy is hit by a
ﬁrst-wave of liquidity shocks. In this wave, a randomly chosen group of one-half of the agents
have liquidity needs. We denote the probability of agent ω receiving a shock in the ﬁrst wave






Equation (1) states that on average, across all agents, the probability of an agent receiving a
shock in the ﬁrst wave is
φ(1)
2 .
With probability φ(2|1), a second wave of liquidity shocks hits the economy. In the second
wave of liquidity shocks, the other half of the agents need liquidity. Let φ(2) = φ(1)φ(2|1).







With probability 1 − φ(1) > 0 the economy experiences no liquidity shocks.
We note that the sequential shock structure means that,
φ(1) >φ (2) > 0. (3)
This condition states that, in aggregate, a single-wave event is more likely than the two-wave
event. We will refer to the two-wave event as an extreme event, capturing an unlikely but
6severe liquidity crisis in which many agents are aﬀected. Relation (3), deriving from the
sequential shock structure, plays an important role in our analysis.
We model the liquidity shock as a shock to preferences (e.g., as in Diamond and Dybvig,
1983). Agent ω receives utility:
U
ω(c1,c 2,c T)=α1u(c1)+α2u(c2)+βcT. (4)
With α1 =1 ,α 2 = 0 if the agent is in the early wave; α1 =0 ,α 2 = 1 if the agent is in the
second wave; and, α1 =0 ,α 2 = 0 if the agent is not hit by a shock. We will refer to the ﬁrst
shock date as “date 1,” the second shock date as “date 2,” and the ﬁnal date as “date T.”
u : R+ →Ris twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, strictly concave and satisﬁes
the condition limc→0 u (c)=∞. Preferences are concave over c1 and c2 and linear over cT.
We view the preference over cT as capturing a time, in the future, when market conditions
are normalized and the trader is eﬀectively risk neutral. The concave preferences over c1 and
c2 reﬂect the potentially higher marginal value of liquidity during a time of market distress.
ENDOWMENT AND SECURITIES
Each agent is endowed with Z units of goods. These goods can be stored at gross return
of one, and then liquidated if an agent receives a liquidity shock. If we interpret the agents of
the model as ﬁnancial traders, we may think of Z as the capital or liquidity of a trader.
Agents can also trade ﬁnancial claims that are contingent on shock realizations. As we will
show, these claims allow agents who do not receive a shock to insure agents who do receive a
shock.
We assume all shocks are observable and contractible. There is no concern that an agent
will pretend to have a shock and collect on an insurance claim. Markets are complete. There
are claims on all histories of shock realizations. We will be more precise in specifying these
contingent claims when we analyze the equilibrium.
PROBABILITIES AND UNCERTAINTY
Agents trade contingent claims to insure against their liquidity shocks. In making the
insurance decisions, agents have a probability model of the liquidity shocks in mind.
We assume that agents know the aggregate shock probabilities, φ(1) and φ(2). We may
think that agents observe the past behavior of the economy and form precise estimates of
these aggregate probabilities. However, and centrally to our model, the same past data does
not reveal whether a given ω is more likely to be in the ﬁrst wave or the second wave. Agents
treat the latter uncertainty as Knightian.
7Formally, we use φω(1) to denote the true probability of agent ω receiving the ﬁrst shock,
and φω
ω(1) to denote agent-ω’s perception of the relevant true probability (similarly for φω(2)
and φω
ω(2)). We assume that each agent ω knows his probability of receiving a shock either in



















ω reﬂects how much agent ω’s probability assessment of being second is higher than










Agents consider a range of probability-models θω
ω in the set Θ, with support [−K,+K]
(K<φ (2)/2)), and design insurance portfolios that are robust to their model uncertainty. We
follow Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) Maximin Expected Utility representation of Knightian










where K captures the extent of agents’ uncertainty.
In a ﬂight to quality event, such as the Fall of 1998 or 9/11, agents are concerned about
systemic risk and unsure of how this risk will impinge on their activities. They may have a
good understanding of their own markets, but are unsure of how the behavior of agents in
other markets may aﬀect them. For example, during 9/11 market participants feared gridlock
in the payments system. Each participant knew how much he owed to others but was unsure
whether resources owed to him would arrive (see, e.g., Stewart, 2002, or Ashcraft and Duﬃe,
2006). In our modeling, agents are certain about the probability of receiving a shock, but are
uncertain about the probability that their shocks will occur early relative to others, or late
relative to others.
5For further clariﬁcation of the structure of shocks and agents’ uncertainty, see the event tree that is
detailed in the Appendix.
8We view agents’ max-min preferences in (7) as descriptive of their decision rules. The
widespread use of worst-case scenario analysis in decision making by ﬁnancial ﬁrms is an
example of the robustness preferences of such agents.
SYMMETRY
To simplify our analysis we assume that the agents are symmetric at date 0. While each
agent’s true θω may be diﬀerent, the θω for every agent is drawn from the same Θ.
The symmetry applies in other dimensions as well: φω,K,Z,and u(c) are the same for all
ω. Moreover, this information is common knowledge. As noted above, φ(1) and φ(2) are also
common knowledge.
2.2 A benchmark
We begin by analyzing the problem when K = 0. This case will clarify the nature of cross-
insurance that is valuable in our economy as well. We derive the equilibrium as a solution to
a planning problem, where the planner allocates the Z across agents as a function of shock
realizations.
Figure 1 below describes the event tree of the economy. The economy may receive zero,
one, or two waves of shocks. An agent ω may be aﬀected in the ﬁrst or second wave in the
two wave case, or may be aﬀected or not aﬀected in the one wave event. We denote s =(#
of waves, ω’s shock) as the state for agent ω.A g e n tω’s allocation as a function of the state
is denoted by Cs where in the event of agent ω being aﬀected by a shock, the agent receives
a consumption allocation upon incidence of the shock, as well as a consumption allocation
at date T. For example, if the economy is hit by two waves of shocks in which agent ω is
aﬀected by the ﬁrst wave, we denote the state as s =( 2 ,1) and agent ω’s allocation as (c1,c s
T).
C = {Cs} is the consumption plan for agent ω (equal to that for every agent, by symmetry).
We note that c1 is the same in both state (2,1) and state (1,1). This is because of the
sequential shock structure in the economy. An agent who receives a shock ﬁrst needs resources
at that time, and the amount of resources delivered cannot be made contingent on whether
the one or two wave event transpires.
Figure 1 also gives the probabilities of each state s. Since agents are ex-ante identical
and K = 0, each agent has the same probability of arriving at state s. Thus we know that
φω(2) = φ(2)/2, which implies that the probability of ω being hit by a shock in the second
wave is one-half. Likewise, the probability of ω being hit by a shock in the ﬁrst wave is
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Figure 1: Benchmark Case








subject to resource constraints that for every shock realization, the promised consumption























as well as non-negativity constraints that for each s, every consumption amount in Cs is
non-negative.
It is obvious that if shocks do not occur, then the planner will give Z to each of the agents
for consumption at date T.T h u sc
0,no
T = Z and we can drop this constant from the objective.



























T enter as a sum in both objective and constraints. Without loss
of generality we set c
1,1




T enter as a sum in both objective and
constraints. Without loss of generality we set c
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Note that the resource constraints must bind. The solution hinges on whether the non-
negativity constraints on consumption bind or not.
If the non-negativity constraints do not bind, then the ﬁrst order condition for c1 and c2
yield:
c1 = c2 = u
 −1(β) ≡ c
∗.
The solution implies that,
c
2,2
T =2 ( Z − c
∗),c
1,no
T =2 Z − c
∗.
Thus the non-negativity constraints do not bind if Z ≥ c∗. We refer to this case as one of
suﬃcient aggregate liquidity.W h e nZ is large enough, agents are able to ﬁnance a consumption
plan in which marginal utility is equalized across all states. At the optimum, agents equate
the marginal utility of early consumption with that of date T consumption, which is β given
the linear utility over cT.
Now consider the case in which there is insuﬃcient liquidity so that agents are not able
to achieve full insurance. This is the case where Z<c ∗.I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t c
2,2
T = 0 in this
case (i.e. use all of the limited liquidity towards shock states). Thus, for a given c1 we have
that c2 = c
1,no
T =2 Z − c1 and the problem is,
max
c1
φ(1)u(c1)+φ(2)u(2Z − c1)+( φ(1) − φ(2))β(2Z − c1)( 8 )













11Since u (2Z − c1) >β(i.e. c2 <c ∗) we can order:
β<u
 (c1) <u
 (2Z − c1) ⇒ c1 >Z . (10)
The last inequality on the right of (10) is the important result from the analysis. Agents
who are aﬀected by the ﬁrst-wave of shocks receive more liquidity than agents who are aﬀected
by the second-wave. There is cross-insurance between agents. Intuitively, this is because the
probability of the second-wave occurring is strictly smaller than that of the ﬁrst-wave (or,
equivalently, conditional on the ﬁrst wave having taken place there is a chance the economy
is spared of a second wave). Thus, when liquidity is scarce (small Z) it is optimal to allocate
more of the limited liquidity to the more likely shock. On the other hand, when liquidity is
plentiful (large Z) the liquidity allocation of each agent is not contingent on the order of the
shocks. This is because there is enough liquidity to cover all shocks.
We summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium in the benchmark economy with K =0has two cases:
• The economy has insuﬃcient aggregate liquidity if Z<c ∗. In this case,
c
∗ >c 1 >Z>c 2.
Agents are partially insured against liquidity shocks. First wave liquidity shocks are more
insured than second wave liquidity shocks.
• The economy has suﬃcient aggregate liquidity if Z ≥ c∗. In this case,
c1 = c2 = c
∗
and agents are fully insured against liquidity shocks.
Flight to quality eﬀects, and a role for central bank intervention, arise only in the ﬁrst case
(insuﬃcient aggregate liquidity). This is the case we analyze in detail in the next sections.
2.3 Implementation
There are two natural implementations of the equilibrium: ﬁnancial intermediation, and trad-
ing in shock-contingent claims.
12In the intermediation implementation, each agent deposits Z in an intermediary initially
and receives the right to withdraw c1 >Z , if he receives a shock in the ﬁrst-wave. Since
shocks are fully observable, the withdrawal can be conditioned on the agents’ shocks. Agents
who do not receive a shock in the ﬁrst wave own claims to the rest of the intermediary’s assets
(Z − c1 <c 1). The second group of agents either redeem their claims upon incidence of the
s e c o n dw a v eo fs h o c k s ,o ra td a t eT. Finally, if no shocks occur, the intermediary is liquidated
at date T and all agents receive Z.
In the contingent claims implementation, each agent purchases a claim that pays 2(c1 −
Z) > 0 in the event that the agent receives a shock in the ﬁrst wave. The agent sells an
identical claim to every other agent, paying 2(c1 − Z) in case of the ﬁrst wave shock. Note
that this is a zero-cost strategy since both claims must have the same price.
If no shocks occur, agents consume their own Z. If an agent receives a shock in the ﬁrst
wave, he receives 2(c1 − Z) and pays out c1 − Z (since one-half of the agents are aﬀected in
the ﬁrst wave), to net c1 −Z. Added to his liquidity of Z, this gives total liquidity of c1.A n y
later agent has Z − (c1 − Z)=2 Z − c1 units of liquidity to either ﬁnance a second shock, or
as date T consumption.
Finally, note that if there is suﬃcient aggregate liquidity either the intermediation or
contingent claims implementation achieves the optimal allocation. Moreover, in this case,
the allocation is also implementable by self-insurance. Each agent keeps his Z and liquidates
c∗ <Zto ﬁnance a shock. The self-insurance implementation is not possible when Z<c ∗,
because the allocation requires each agent to receive more than his endowment of Z if the
agent is hit ﬁrst.
2.4 K>0 robustness case
We now turn to the general problem when K>0. Once again, we derive the equilibrium
by solving a planning problem where the planner allocates the Z to agents as a function of
shocks. When K>0, agents make decisions based on a “worst-case” for the probabilities.











The only change in the problem relative to the K = 0 case is that probabilities are based on
the worst-case min rule.
13Figure 2 redraws the event tree now indicating agent’s worst-case probabilities. We use
the notation that φω
ω(2) is agent ω’s worst-case probability of being hit second. In our setup,
this assessment only matters when the economy is going through a two-wave event in which
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Figure 2: Robustness Case
We simplify the problem following some of the steps of the previous derivation. c
0,no
T must





T enter as sum in both objective and constraint and choose c
1,1
T =0 .





























The ﬁrst two terms in this objective are the utility from the consumption bundle if the agent
is hit ﬁrst (either in the one wave or two wave event). The third term is the utility from the
consumption bundle if the agent is hit second. The last term is the utility from the bundle
when the agent is not hit in a one-wave event.
6We derive the probabilities as follows. p2,2,ω = φω
ω(2) by deﬁnition. This implies that p2,1,ω = φ(2)−φω
ω(2)





2 using relation (5). The probability of ω being hit ﬁrst is φω
ω(1) = p2,1,ω+p1,1,ω.
Substituting for p2,1,ω, we can rewrite this to ﬁnd that p1,1,ω =
φ(1)+φ(2)
2 . Finally,p1,1,ω+p1,no,ω = φ(1)−φ(2),
which we can use to solve for p1,no,ω.



















Then, the equilibrium in the robust economy depends on both K and Z as follows:
• When there is insuﬃcient aggregate liquidity, there are two cases:

























c2 <Z<c 1 <c
∗
with c1(K) decreasing and c2(K) increasing. We refer to this as the “partially
robust” case.
– For K ≥ ¯ K, agents’ decisions are as if K = ¯ K,a n d
c1 = Z = c2 <c
∗.
We refer to this as the “fully robust” case.
• When there is suﬃcient aggregate liquidity (Z),a g e n t s ’d e c i s i o n ss a t i s f y ,
c1 = c2 = c
∗ <Z .
15The formal proof of the proposition is in the Appendix, and is complicated by the need
to account for all possible consumption plans for every given θω
ω scenario when solving the
max-min problem. But, there is a simple intuition that explains the results.
We show in the Appendix that c
2,1
T ,a n dc
2,2
T are always equal to zero. Dropping these


















For the case of insuﬃcient aggregate liquidity, the resource constraints give:
c2 =2 Z − c1,c
1,no
T =2 Z − c1.


















2 ,w h i c h
yields the solution calling for more liquidity to whoever is aﬀected by the ﬁrst shock (c1 >c 2).
When K>0, agents are uncertain over whether their shocks are early or late relative to other
agents. Under the max-min decision rule, agents use the worst case probability in making
decisions. Thus, they bias up the probability of being second relative to that of being ﬁrst.


















As K becomes larger, c2 increases toward c1.F o r K suﬃciently large, c2 is set equal to c1.
This deﬁnes the threshold of ¯ K. In this “fully robust” case, agents are insulated against their
uncertainty over whether their shocks are likely to be ﬁrst or second.
2.5 Flight to quality
A ﬂight to quality episode can be understood in our model as a comparative static across
K or Z. Let us ﬁx a value of K and Z and suppose that at a date −1, agents enter into a
contractual arrangement as dictated by Proposition 2. At date 0, there is an unanticipated
(non-contracted) event that increases K (or reduces Z) and leads agents to rewrite contracts.
We may think of a ﬂight to quality in terms of this rewriting of contracts.
16In this subsection we discuss three concrete examples of ﬂight to quality events in the
context of our model. Our ﬁrst two examples identify the model in terms of the ﬁnancial
intermediation implementation discussed earlier, while the last example identiﬁes the model
in terms of the contingent claims implementation.
The ﬁrst example is one of uncertainty-driven contagion and is drawn from the events of
the fall of 1998. We interpret the agents of our model as the trading desks of an investment
bank. Each trading desk concentrates in a diﬀerent asset market. At date −1 the trading
desks pool their capital with a top-level risk manager of the investment bank, retaining c2 of
capital to cover any needs that may arise in their particular market (“committed capital”).
They also agree that the top-level risk manager will provide an extra c1 − c2 > 0t oc o v e r
shocks that hit whichever market needs capital ﬁrst (“trading capital”). At date 0, Russia
defaults. An agent in an unrelated market – i.e. a market in which shocks are now no more
likely then before, so that φω
ω(1) + φω
ω(2) is unchanged – suddenly becomes concerned that
other trading desks will suﬀer shocks ﬁrst and therefore the agent’s trading desk will not
have as much capital available in the event of a shock. The agent responds by lobbying the
top-level risk manager to increase his committed capital up to a level of c2 = c1.A sar e s u l t ,
every trading desk now has less capital in the (likelier) event of a single shock. Scholes (2000)
argues that during the 1998 crisis, the natural liquidity suppliers (hedge funds and trading
desks) became liquidity demanders. In our model, uncertainty causes the trading desks to tie
up more of the capital of the investment bank. The average market has less capital to absorb
shocks, suggesting reduced liquidity in all markets.
In this example, the Russian default leads to less liquidity in other unrelated asset markets.
Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2006) present evidence that the mortgage-backed
securities market, a market unrelated to the sovereign bond market, suﬀered lower liquidity
and wider spreads in the 1998 crisis. Note also that in this example there is no contagion
eﬀect if Z is large as the agents’ trading desk will not be concerned about having the necessary
capital to cover shocks when Z>c ∗. Thus, any realized losses by investment banks during
the Russian default strengthen the mechanism we highlight.
Our second example is a variant of the classical bank-run, but on the credit side of a
commercial bank. The agents of the model are corporates. The corporates deposit Z in a
commercial bank at date −1 and sign revolvingcredit lines that give them the right to c1 if they
receivea shock. The corporates are also aware that if banking conditions deteriorate (a second
wave of shocks) the bank will raise lending standards/loan rates so that the corporates will
17eﬀectivelyreceive only c2 <c 1. The ﬂight to quality event is triggered by the commercial bank
suﬀering losses and corporates becoming concerned that the two-wave event will transpire.
They respond by preemptivelydrawing down credit lines, eﬀectivelyleading all ﬁrms to receive
less than c1. Gatev and Strahan (2006) present evidence of this sort of credit-line run during
periods when the spread between commercial paper and Treasury bills widens (as in the fall
of 1998).
The last example is one of the interbank market for liquidity and the payment system. The
agents of the model are all commercial banks who have Z Treasury bills at the start of the day.
Each commercial bank knows that there is some possibility that it will suﬀer a large outﬂow
from its reserve account, which it can oﬀset by selling Treasury bills. To ﬁx ideas, suppose
that bank A is worried about this happening at 4pm. At date −1, the banks enter into an
interbank lending arrangement so that a bank that suﬀers such a shock ﬁrst, receives credit on
advantageous terms (worth c1 of T-bills). If a second set of shocks hits, banks receive credit
at worse terms of c2 (say, the discount window). At date 0, 9/11 occurs. Suppose that bank
A is a bank outside New York City which is not directly aﬀected by the events, but which is
concerned about a possible reserve outﬂow at 4pm. However, now bank A becomes concerned
that other commercial banks will need liquidity and that these needs may arise before 4pm.
Then, bank A will renegotiate its interbank lending arrangements and be unwilling to provide
c1 to any banks that receive shocks ﬁrst. Rather, it will hoard its Treasury Bills of Z to cover
its own possible shock at 4pm. In this example, uncertainty causes banks to hoard resources,
which is often the systemic concern in a payments gridlock (e.g., Stewart, 2002, and Ashcraft
and Duﬃe, 2006).
The diﬀerent interpretations we have oﬀered show that the model’s agents and their actions
can be mapped into the actors and actions during a ﬂight to quality episode in a modern
ﬁnancial system. As is apparent, our environment is a variant of the one that Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) study. In that model, the sequential service constraint creates a coordination
failure and the possibility of a bad crisis equilibrium in which depositors run on the bank.
In our model, the crisis is an unanticipated rise in Knightian uncertainty rather than the
realization of the bad equilibrium. Our model also oﬀers interpretations of a crisis in terms
of the rewriting of ﬁnancial contracts triggered by the uncertainty increase, rather than the
behavior of a bank’s creditors.7
7There is an underlying connection between the crisis in our model and that of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
As Diamond and Dybvig emphasize, a deposit contract implements an optimal shock-contingent allocation of
183 Collective Bias and the Value of Intervention
In this section, we study the beneﬁts of central bank actions in the ﬂight to quality episode of
our model. Since the agents of the model are not standard expected utility maximizers (i.e.
adhering to the Savage axioms), there are delicate issues that arise when deﬁning the central
bank’s objective. On the one hand, if the central bank’s objective is the min-max objective of
the planner in (11), then since we have previously derived the equilibrium as the solution to
a planner’s problem, the central bank cannot improve on the allocation. On the other hand,
throughout this section, we argue for a paternalistic central bank objective which does not
incorporate agents’ worst-case probability assessments. We argue that there are “natural”
paternalistic policies that arise in our setting.8
3.1 Collective bias
In the fully robust equilibrium of Proposition 2 agents insure equally against ﬁrst and second
shocks. To arrive at the equal insurance solution, robust agents evaluate their ﬁrst order


























The two in front of these expressions reﬂects the fact that only one-half of agents are aﬀected
by each of the shocks. Integrating equation (14) and using the deﬁnitions above, we ﬁnd that
liquidity. In the fully robust equilibrium of our model, agents choose an allocation that is non-contingent on
each other’s shocks instead of the contingent liquidity allocation of the benchmark economy. In this sense,
robust agents’ preference for shock-independent liquidity allocations is related to the behavior of panicked
depositors in a bank run.
8The appropriate notion of welfare in models where agents are not rational is subject to some debate in
the literature. The debate centers on whether or not the planner should use the same model to describe
choices and welfare (see, e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) and Bernheim and Rangel (2005) for two sides of
the argument). See also Sims (2001) in the context of a central bank’s objective.
19agents’ conservative probabilities are such that,





<φ (1) − φ(2).
The last inequality follows in the case of insuﬃcient aggregate liquidity (Z<c ∗).
Implicitly, these conservative probabilities overweight an agent’s chances of being aﬀected
second in the two-wave event. Since each agent is concerned about the scenario in which
he receives a shock last and there is little liquidity left, robustness considerations lead each
agent to bias upwards the probability of receiving a shock later than the average agent.
However, every agent cannot be later than the “average.” Across all agents, the conservative
probabilities violate the known probabilities of the ﬁrst and second wave events, implying that
agents’ conservative probabilities are collectively biased.
Note that each agent’s conservative probabilities are individually plausible. Given the
range of uncertainty over θω, it is possible that agent ω has a higher than average probability
of being second. Only when viewed from the aggregate does it become apparent the scenario
that the collective of conservative agents are guarding against is impossible.
These observations motivate us to study how a central bank, which is interested in maxi-
mizing the collective, can improve on outcomes.
3.2 Central bank information and objective
The central bank knows the aggregate probabilities φ(1), φ(2), and knows that the φω’s are
drawn from a common distribution for all ω. We have previously noted that this information
is common knowledge, so we are not endowing the central bank with any more information
than agents. The central bank also understands that because of agents’ ex-ante symmetry, all
agents choose the same contingent consumption plan Cs.W ed e n o t eps,CB
ω as the probabilities
that the central bank assigns to the diﬀerent events that may aﬀect agent ω. Like agents, the
central bank does not know the true probabilities ps
ω. Additionally, ps,CB
ω may diﬀer from ps,ω
ω .
The central bank is concerned with the equally weighted ex-post utility that agents derive















20where the second line follows from exchanging the integral and summation, and using the fact
that the aggregate probabilities are common knowledge.
One can view this objective as descriptive of how central banks behave: As noted above,
central banks are interested in the collective outcome, and thus it is natural that the objective
adopts the average consumption utility of agents in the economy.
The objective can also be seen as corresponding to agents’ welfare. Two potential issues
arise when making the latter identiﬁcation. First, since the objective is based on ex-post
consumption utility, it ignores any utility costs that agents may suﬀer because of date 0
“anxieties” about ex-post outcomes. Second, if we introduce some rational agents into the
economy, they may suﬀer from the type of policies we discuss in this and the next section. We
address the second concern below. In contrast, we ignore the ﬁrst one, which is what makes
ours a paternalistic criterion.
3.3 Collective risk management and wasted liquidity
Starting from the robust equilibrium of Proposition 2, consider a central bank that alters
agents’ decisions by increasing c1 by an inﬁnitesimal amount, and decreasing c2 and c
1,no
T by

























and equation (16) implies that there there is no gain to the central bank from a reallocation.
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21Substituting this relation into (16), it follows that the value of the reallocation to the central
bank is K(u (c1)+u (c2)) which is positive for all K>0.
Summarizing these results:
Proposition 3 For any K>0, if the economy has insuﬃcient aggregate liquidity (Z<c ∗),
agent decisions are collectively biased. Agents choose too much insurance against receiving
shocks second relative to receiving shocks ﬁrst. A central bank that maximizes the expected (ex-
post) utility of agents in the economy can improve outcomes by reallocating agents’ insurance
toward the ﬁrst shock.
The reallocation is valuable to the central bank because from its perspective agents are
wasting aggregate liquidity by self-insuring excessively rather than cross-insuring risks.
The central bank reaches this conclusion requiring only knowledge of aggregate probabil-
ities. As we have remarked, the central bank may be more confused than individual agents
about individual θωs. In this sense, the central bank may be the least informed agent of the
economy. The important point is that the central bank does not suﬀer from collective bias.9
In fact, going beyond local perturbations, the linearity with respect to individual probabilities
of the central bank objective in (15) implies that the central bank solves the K =0p r o b l e m
of the planner in Section 2, regardless of how uninformed it may be about individual θωs.
3.4 Welfare and paternalism
To what extent does the central bank’s objective correspond to welfare? We oﬀer two further
arguments in favor of our paternalistic welfare criterion in this subsection. First, suppose that
a fraction of the agents in the economy are rational and had probabilities such that θω =+ K;
i.e. these agents know that the worst-case probabilities are truly their own probabilities.
Suppose the rest of the agents are Knightian agents with θω’s such that the average θω across
all agents is zero. In this case, reallocating insurance from second to ﬁrst shocks hurts the
rational agents while it helps the average Knightian agent. However, note that the envelope
theorem implies that the utility cost to the rational agents is second order, while, since the
9If the central bank is uncertain about the values of φ(1) and φ(2), then we could overturn the result. In
particular, we may imagine a situation in which the central bank is uncertain about these probabilities, and its
objective function overweights liquidity crises (i.e. the incidence of both shocks occurring). In this case, the
central bank will also be subject to the “overinsurance” bias of agents. However, this “bias” is of a diﬀerent
nature than the one we emphasize as it would not be collectively inconsistent with conditional probabilities.
22envelope theorem does not apply to the average Knightian agent, the policy results in a ﬁrst
order utility gain to the Knightian agents. Thus, although the central bank’s policy is not
Pareto improving, it involves asymmetric gains to the Knightian agents. Our policy satisﬁes
the asymmetric paternalism criterion that Camerer, et. al., (2003) propose for evaluating
policy when some agents are behavioral.
Another justiﬁcation is through the following thought experiment: Suppose that we repeat
the liquidityepisode we have described inﬁnitelymany times. At the beginning of each episode,
agent ω draws a θω ∈ Θ. These draws are i.i.d. across episodes, and the agent knows that
on average his θω will be zero. In each episode, since agent ω does not know the θω for that
episode, the agent’s worst-case decision rule will have him using θω =+ K. The central bank’s
ex-post utility criterion corresponds to the expected consumption utility of an agent across
all of these episodes, where the expectation is taken using agents’ known probabilities.10
3.5 Risk aversion versus uncertainty aversion
Given the centrality of collective bias in Proposition 3, it should be apparent that while
increased risk aversion may generate positive implications (ﬂight to quality) that are similar
to those of Knightian uncertainty, its normative implications are not. Without collectivebias,
and regardless of the agent’s degree or change in risk aversion, our central bank sees no reason
to reallocate liquidity toward the ﬁrst wave of shocks beyond the private sector’s choices.
We can make this point precise by returning to the agents’ ﬁrst order condition in the


















If we think of a ﬂight to quality event in terms of increased risk aversion then it is clear that
c1 falls and c2 rises as γ rises. However, since K = 0, there is no role for the central bank in
this case.
10In living through repeated liquidity events, an agent will learn over time about the true distribution of
θω. However, it is still the case that along this learning path, K remains strictly positive (while shrinking)
and hence the qualitative features of our argument will go through for a small enough agent discount rate.
23We conclude that there is a role for the central bank only in situations of Knightian
uncertainty and insuﬃcient aggregate liquidity. Of course not all recessionary episodes exhibit
these ingredients. But there are many scenarios where they are present, such as October 1987
and the Fall of 1998.
4 An Application: Lender of Last Resort
The abstract reallocation experiment considered in Proposition 3 makes clear that during
ﬂight to quality episodes the central bank will ﬁnd it desirable to induce agents to insure less
against second shocks and more against ﬁrst shocks. In this section we discuss an application
of this result and consider a lender of last resort (LLR) policy in light of the gain identiﬁed
in Proposition 3.
As in Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), we assume the LLR has access
to collateral that private agents do not (or at least, it has access at a lower cost). Woodford
and Holmstrom and Tirole focus on the direct value of intervening using this collateral. Our
novel result is that, because of the reallocation beneﬁt of Proposition 3, the value of the LLR
exceeds the direct value of the intervention. Thus our model sheds light on a new beneﬁt of
the LLR.
The model also stipulates when thebeneﬁt will be highest. Aswe haveremarkedpreviously,
the reallocation beneﬁt only arises in situations where K>0a n dZ<c ∗. This carries over
directly to our analysis of the LLR: the beneﬁts are highest when K>0a n dZ<c ∗.W ea l s o
show that the LLR must be a last-resort policy. In fact, if liquidity injections take place too
often, the reallocation eﬀect works against the policy and reduces its value.
4.1 LLR policy
Formally, the central bank credibly expands the resources of agents in the two-shock event by
an amount ZG. That is, agents who are aﬀected second in the two-wave event (s =( 2 ,2)), will
have their consumption increased from c2 to c2 +2 ZG (twice ZG because one-half measure of




T ≤ 2Z (17)
c1 + c2 ≤ 2Z +2 Z
G. (18)
24In practice, the central bank’s promise may be supported by a credible commitment to costly
ex-post inﬂation or taxation and carried out by guaranteeing, against default, the liabilities
of ﬁnancial intermediaries who have sold ﬁnancial claims against extreme events. Since we
are interested in computing the marginal beneﬁt of intervention, we study an inﬁnitesimal
intervention of ZG.
If the central bank oﬀers more insurance against the two-shock event, this insurance has
a direct beneﬁt in terms of reducing the disutility of an adverse outcome. The direct beneﬁt







 (c2,ω)dω = φ(2)u
 (c2).
The anticipation of the central bank’s second-shock insurance leads agents to reoptimize
their insurance decisions. Agents reduce their private insurance against the publicly insured
second-shock and increase their ﬁrst-shock insurance. The total beneﬁt of the intervention





































We simplify the expression for V
CB,total
ZG by integrating through φω(1) and φω(2) and then

























































The additional beneﬁt we identify is due to portfolio reoptimization: Agents cut back on
the publicly insured second shock and increase ﬁrst shock insurance, thereby moving their
25decisions closer to what the central bank would choose for them. In this sense, the LLR
policy can help to implement the policy suggested in Proposition 3.
We also note that without Knightian uncertainty (K = 0), there is no gain (beyond the
direct beneﬁt) from the policy. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that if Z>c ∗ then
agents will not use the additional insurance to cover their liquidity shocks, but will reoptimize
in a way as to use the insurance at date T. In this case also there is no gain to oﬀering the
public insurance (since
dc1
dZG = 0 ). We summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 4 For K>0 and Z<c ∗, the total value of the lender of last resort policy






It is important to note that under the LLR policy the central bank injects resources
only rarely. As we associate the second-shock event with an extreme and unlikely event,
in expectation the central bank does not promise many resources. This aspect of policy is
similar to Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) analysis of a LLR. However there are a few important
diﬀerences in the mechanism through which the policies work. As there is no coordination
failure in our model, the policy does not work by ruling out a “bad” equilibrium. Rather,
the policy works by reducing the agents’ “anxiety” that they will receive a shock last when
the economy has depleted its liquidity resources. It is this anxiety that leads agents to use
ah i g hφω
ω(2) in their decision rules. From this standpoint, it is also clear that an important
ingredient in the policy is that agents have to believe that the central bank will have the
necessary resources in the two-event shock in order to reduce their anxiety. Credibility and
commitment are central to the working of our LLR policy.11
4.2 Moral hazard and early interventions
The policy we have suggested cuts against the usual moral hazard critique of central bank
interventions. The moral hazard critique is predicated on agents responding to the provision
of public insurance by cutting back on their own insurance activities. In our model, in keeping
with the moral hazard critique, agents reallocate insurance away from the publicly insured
11In this sense, the policy relates to the government bond policy of Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998) who argue that government promises are unique because they have greater collateral backing
than private sector promises.
26shock. However, when ﬂight to quality is the concern, the reallocation improves (ex-post)
outcomes on average.12 Public and private provision of insurance are complements in our
model.
This logic suggests that interventions against ﬁrst shocks may be subject to the moral
hazard critique as agents’ portfolio reoptimization would lead them toward more insurance
against the second shock. To consider the “early intervention” case, suppose that the central
bank credibly oﬀers to increase the consumption of agents who are aﬀected in the ﬁrst shock
from c1 to c1 +2 ZG. The resource constraints for agents (for the reduced problem) are:
c1 + c
1,no
T ≤ 2Z +2 Z
G
c1 + c2 ≤ 2Z +2 Z
G.
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The expected cost of the early intervention policy is much larger than the second shock
intervention, since the central bank rather than the private sector bears the cost of insurance
against the (likely) single-shock event. Agents reallocate the expected resources from the
central bank to the two-shock event, which is exactly the opposite of what the central bank
wants to achieve. In this sense, interventions in intermediate events are subject to the moral
hazard critique. We conclude that the lender of last resort facility, to be eﬀective and improve
private ﬁnancial markets, has to be a last and not an intermediate resort.
12Note that if the direct eﬀect of intervention is insuﬃcient to justify intervention, then the lender of last
resort policy is time inconsistent. This result is not surprising as the beneﬁt of the policy comes precisely from
the private sector reaction, not from the policy itself.
274.3 Multiple shocks
It is clear that the LLR should not intervene during early shocks and instead should only
pledge resources for late shocks; but if we move away from our two-shock model to a more
realistic context with multiple potential waves of aggregate shocks, how late is late?
To answer this question we extend the model to consider multiple shocks. We assume
the economy may experience n =1 ...N waves of shocks, each aﬀecting
1
N of the agents. The
probability of the economy experiencing n waves is denoted φ(n), with φ(n) <φ (n−1). Also,





The LLR policy takes the following form: The central bank injects
1
N−j+1 units of liquidity
for all shocks after (and including) the jth wave (j ≤ N). We also simplify our analysis by
focusing on the fully robust case where cn is the same for all n and by setting β =0 ,t h e r e b y
assuring that Z<c ∗ and allowing us to disregard eﬀects on c
n,no
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Agents reduce insurance against the publicly insured shocks and increase their private
insurance for the rest of the shocks. The total beneﬁt of the intervention includes both the
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In the fully robust case, cn,ω and
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28Note that this expression is independent of the intervention rule j. In contrast, it is apparent
that V
CB,direct



















is strictly greater than one for all j>1 and is increasing with respect to j.
Of course, the above result does not suggest that intervention should occur only in the Nth
shock. Instead, it suggests that for any given amount of resources available for intervention,
the LLR should ﬁrst pledge resources to the Nth shock and continue to do so until it completely
replaces private insurance, it should then move on to the N − 1st shock, and so on.
The multiple shock model also clariﬁes another beneﬁt of late intervention. As j rises,
events that are being insured by the LLR become increasingly less likely. If we take the case
where the shadow cost of the LLR resources for the central bank is constant, the expected
cost of the LLR policy falls as j rises, while the expected beneﬁt remains constant.
In other words, as j rises, it is the private sector that increasingly improves the allocation
of scarce private resources to early and more likely aggregate shocks, thereby reducing the
extent of the ﬂight-to-quality phenomenon. In contrast, the central bank plays a decreasingly
small role in terms of the expected value of resources actually disbursed, as j increases.
Thus, while a well designed LLR policy may indeed have a direct eﬀect only in highly
unlikely events, the policy is not irrelevant for likely outcomes. Its main beneﬁts come from
unlocking private markets to insure more likely and less extreme events.
5 Final remarks
Flight to quality is a pervasive phenomenon that exacerbates the impact of recessionary shocks
and ﬁnancial accelerators. The starting point of this paper is a model of this phenomenon
based on Knightian uncertainty aversion among ﬁnancial specialists. We show that when
aggregate liquidity is plentiful, agents’ uncertainty does not aﬀect the equilibrium. However,
when there is both Knightian uncertainty and agents think that aggregate liquidity is scarce,
they take a set of protective actions to guarantee themselves safety, but which leave the
aggregate economy overexposed to negative shocks.
In this context, a Lender of Last Resort policy is valuable when used to support rare events.
Our model prescribes that the beneﬁt of the LLR is highest when there is both insuﬃcient
29aggregate liquidity and Knightian uncertainty. Many of the examples we have discussed in
this paper (1987 market crash, Fall of 1998, 9/11) satisfy these criteria. But just as important
are times when the “dog did not bark.” For example, a recession in which the ingredients are
not both central, does not call for central bank action. Likewise, we prescribe that a default
by a hedge fund – even one that is large – should not elicit central bank reaction unless the
default triggers considerable uncertainty in other market participants and hedge funds are
ﬁnancially weak. The model also suggests that it is important for the central bank to have an
understanding of whether a given market dynamic is driven by risk or uncertainty.
There is currently considerable uncertainty over how the downgrade of a top name will
aﬀect the credit derivatives market. Our model suggests that ex-ante actions to reduce the
extent of uncertaintyduring a ﬂight to quality episode are valuable. For example, recent moves
to increase transparency and risk assessment in this market as well as streamline back-oﬃce
settlement procedures can be viewed in this light (Geithner, 2006).
The implications of the framework extend beyond the particular interpretation we have
given to agents and policymakers. For example, in the international context one may think
of our agents as countries and the policymaker as the IMF or other IFI’s. Then, our model
prescribes that the IMF not support the ﬁrst country hit by a sudden stop, but to commit
to intervene once contagion takes place. The beneﬁt of this policy comes primarily from the
additional availability of private resources to limit the impact of the initial pullback of capital
ﬂows.
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Prob φ(1) − φ(2)




2W a v e s
1W a v e
No Shocks
The event tree is pictured above. The probability of two waves aﬀecting the economy is
φ(2); the probability of one wave aﬀecting the economy is φ(1) − φ(2); and, the probability
of no waves aﬀecting the economy is 1 − φ(1). We used the dashed box around “1st wave”
to signify that agents are unsure whether they are in the upper branch (one more wave will
occur) or the middle branch (no further shocks).
Consider an agent ω who may be aﬀected in these waves. Suppose that his probability of
being aﬀected by a shock when the event is the middle branch (“1 wave”) is one-half. Suppose
that his probability of being of being aﬀected by a ﬁrst shock when the event is the upper
branch (“2 waves”) is ψω, while his probability of being aﬀected by a second shock is 1 − ψω.
Moreover, suppose that the agent is uncertain about ψω, which we interpret as the agent is
uncertain about his likelihood of being ﬁrst or second, in the case of a two wave event.
The agent’s probability of being aﬀected by a ﬁrst shock is,




The agent’s probability of being aﬀected by a second shock is,
φω(2) = φ(2)(1 − ψω).
Note that,




















These expressions show that the event tree is consistent with agents being certain about their
probability of receiving a shock, but being uncertain about their relative probabilities of being
ﬁrst or second. In the text, we describe the uncertainty in terms of φω(2) −
φ(2)
2 rather than
in terms of ψω.
B Proof or Proposition 2
We focus on the case of insuﬃcient aggregate liquidity (Z<c ∗). The other case follows the
same logic as the K = 0 case. We are looking for a solution to the problem in equation
(12). We can describe this problem in the game-theoretic language often used in max-min
problems. The agent chooses C to maximize V (C;θω
ω) anticipating that “nature” will choose
θω
ω to minimize V (C;θω
ω) given the agent’s choice of C.
The solution (¯ θω




That is, nature chooses θω
ω optimally given the agent’s choiceof ¯ C. Second, ¯ C∈argmaxCV (C; ¯ θω
ω).











Let us ﬁrst ask whether there exists a solution in which
∂V
∂θω
ω < 0. If so, then clearly θω
ω =+ K.
Taking this value of θω
ω let us consider the agent’s problem in equation (12). First note that
c
2,1
T = 0. To see this, suppose that c
2,1
T > 0. Then we can reduce c
2,1
T by δ and increase c
2,2
T by
δ and produce a utility gain of δ(φω
ω(2) − φ(2) + φω
ω(2)) > 0w h e nθω
ω > 0.
With this knowledge, we rewrite the condition that ∂V
∂θω
ω < 0a s ,
u(c2)+βc
2,2
T <u (c1) ⇒ c1 >c 2
13The fact that the agent chooses C before nature chooses θω
ω does not aﬀect our problem. To see this, note
that choosing ﬁrst only gives the agent an advantage if the agent can induce nature to choose a θω
ω diﬀerent
than ¯ θω
ω. Suppose the agent chooses C  = ¯ C to increase V (·). Clearly this choice reduces V below V (¯ θω
ω, ¯ C).
Thus, nature can always choose to set θω
ω = ¯ θω
ω and make the agent strictly worse oﬀ than at the choice C = ¯ C.
35If c1 >c 2 and Z<c ∗ it follows from the resource constraint that c2 <c ∗.B u ti fc2 <c ∗ then
from the agent’s problem, we must have that c
2,2
T = 0 (i.e. do not save any resources for date
T if these resources could be used earlier).
Thus, we only need to consider the agent’s problem in (12) for values of c1,c 2,c
1,no
T > 0.
The ﬁrst order condition for the agent at θω


















We note that for K = 0, the unique solution to the agent’s problem is c1 >c 2.T h u s ,f o r
small values of K, a solution exists in which the agent chooses c1 >c 2 and nature chooses
θω
ω =+ K. This is the partially robust solution given in the Proposition.


















which gives the expression for the value of ¯ K deﬁned in the Proposition.
Note that if K> ¯ K,t h es o l u t i o nθω
ω =+¯ K and c1 = c2 still solves both the agent’s and
nature’s optimization problems. The agent’s choice is uniquely optimal at θω
ω =+¯ K, while
nature is indiﬀerent over values of θω
ω ∈ [−K,+K]. This is the fully robust solution given in
the Proposition.
We have thus far shown that considering the case where
∂V
∂θω
ω ≤ 0, the solution given in the
Proposition is the only solution to the problem in (12). We conclude by showing that there
are no other solutions to the problem. To do this, we only need to consider whether there




Suppose there does exist such a solution. If
∂V
∂θω
ω > 0, then θω
ω = −K. We can go back




T must both be
zero in this case. Then the condition that
∂V
∂θω
ω > 0 is equivalent to,
c1 <c 2


















The solution to this problem is that c1 >c 2, which is a contradiction. Thus there does not
exist a solution in which
∂V
∂θω
ω > 0.
36